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讲座题目：The Impact Of Short Selling On Accrual-based And Real Earnings Management：Evidence From China

主 讲 人：祝继高

讲座时间：5月15日（周一）中午11:00-12:20

讲座地点：松江校区教师活动中心（师苑餐厅二楼）

备　　注：讲座将以午餐会形式召开，请有意向参加的老师在5月12日（本周五）中午12:00前，将自己的姓名、所属单位发送至malina@lixin.edu.cn用以报名，谢谢大家。

主讲人简介：

祝继高，对外经济贸易大学商学院教授、博士生导师，主要研究领域为公司财务、会计信息与资本市场、企业社会责任等。祝继高教授已在Journal of Banking and Finance(SSCI)、Journal of Business Ethics(SSCI)、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《会计研究》、《金融研究》、《中国工业经济》等国内外学术核心期刊发表20余篇学术论文，主持了多项国家自然科学基金项目课题及省部级课题，曾荣获商务部2014-2015年度商务发展研究成果奖三等奖（论文类），第五届“杨纪琬会计学奖”（2011），2013年北京高校第八届青年教师教学基本功比赛一等奖（文史A组）、最佳演示奖（文史A组），是《Journal of Business Ethics》、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《南开管理评论》、《金融研究》、《会计研究》、《世界经济》等期刊匿名审稿人。

讲座摘要：We study the impact of short selling on accrual-based and real earnings management (EM). Using the recent short sales deregulations in China, we examine how less short sales restriction affects the extent of both types of EM. A firm can be honest and engage in less accrual-based and real EM when facing short seller monitoring and scrutiny. That is, it chooses to disclose negative information (the information efficiency hypothesis). Alternatively, a firm can switch from less sophisticated methods, such as accrual-based EM, to sophisticated methods, such as real EM, to cover up negative information to counter the efforts of short sellers (the sophisticated information hiding hypothesis). Our findings suggest that firms engage in less accrual-based EM after short sales deregulations but engage in more real EM. We also find that the extent of real EM is more severe among non-SOEs and firms with non-Big 4 auditors, suggesting that when incentives to cover up information are strong (e.g., non-SOEs) or outside monitoring is weak (e.g., firms with non-Big 4 auditors), a firm engages in more real EM. Furthermore, after short sales deregulation, the crash risk of shortable stocks increases, in particular when their real EM is high. Our findings are consistent with the sophisticated hiding information hypothesis.

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会计学院  

2017年5月9日